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David Hume and Thomas Reid by rejecting the view that the ideal reflects 
the way human persons actually form beliefs. For instance, many of our 
beliefs are formed on the basis of testimony, and the ideal fails to consider 
this. RE claims that the ideal fails to hold not only for everyday beliefs, but 
also for religious beliefs.
RE is not only a negative project in epistemology. It is not simply the 
rejection of previous ideas. RE seeks to offer a positive account as well. 
Various RE thinkers focus on different epistemological merits, such as 
justification and warrant. Wolterstorff’s work focuses on the merit of en-
titlement as it relates to rationality. Are theists entitled to their religious 
beliefs? Is there some epistemic obligation that they have failed to meet? 
When it comes to discerning if someone is entitled to her belief, one must 
discern if she has fulfilled her epistemic duty. This depends on various 
factors and belief dispositions that a person has. For Wolterstorff, there is 
no doxastic ideal for the ethics of belief that cuts across all persons, places, 
and times. “Obligations to employ practices of inquiry are personally situ-
ated obligations” (111). In employing a practice of inquiry, one must choose 
from among practices that are socially and personally acceptable, as well 
as personally accessible (102–103). As such, whether or not one is entitled 
to her belief is a complex person-situated matter.
Further, we often assess the rationality of our beliefs after we have 
formed them. Part of being entitled to a belief is assessing the beliefs that 
we find ourselves having. Our beliefs are “innocent-until-proven-guilty” 
(257). Being entitled could mean that a person has considered various ar-
guments against her belief and found her belief unscathed. Or it could 
involve her deliberately intervening in the formation of one of her beliefs. 
The only way we can discern if she is rational is by scrutinizing her indi-
vidual belief system and the way she has used her noetic equipment (262).
Both volumes contain valuable discussions for those interested in phi-
losophy of religion, philosophical theology, and epistemology. Each would 
be useful for supplemental reading in a course on philosophy of religion 
or religious epistemology. Volume 2 is especially important for those who 
are researching reformed epistemology. Both volumes are a must have for 
those who are enamored with Wolterstorff’s writings. 
Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, by 
Michael Murray. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 206 pages. $70.00 
(cloth).
JOSEPH J. LYNCH, California Polytechnic State University
Michael Murray has written a provocative and challenging work on an is-
sue that is often passed over far too quickly in discussions of the problem 
of evil. In this work he gives the problem of animal suffering the attention 
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it deserves, carefully analyzing various attempts to reconcile the omnipo-
tence and benevolence of the God of Theism with the existence of animal 
pain and suffering. Murray contends that this indeed can be done, and 
while it is doubtful someone not already sympathetic to theism will be 
convinced, the arguments are worthy of serious consideration and likely 
to provoke further discussion on a neglected topic.
The critic of theism argues that [1] If God exists there would be no gra-
tuitous evil (e.g., animal suffering), [2] There is gratuitous suffering, [3] 
Therefore God does not exist. Murray acknowledges that a mere defense 
of Theism is insufficient. A defense would show only that the critic has 
failed to establish that Theism is unlikely due to the fact of animal suffer-
ing. That is, the Theist could claim endorse [1] and deny [3] from which it 
follows that [2] is false. While such a defense may be successful, it provides 
no positive reasons to reconcile animal suffering with the existence of God. 
On the other hand, a full theodicy, which would explain every instance 
of animal suffering, goes too far, because it seems unlikely that humans 
could possibly know every divine purpose. Murray argues for a kind of 
middle path, which he calls a Causa Dei (CD), a term he borrowed from 
Leibniz. A successful CD would show that we are not justified in believ-
ing animal suffering to be gratuitous and thus counting the suffering as 
evidence against God’s existence—in the light of our justified acceptances. 
That is, the successful CD would undermine [2]. Murray then systemati-
cally analyzes several CDs, contending that at least some are successful.
In the first chapter of the book, Murray discusses three moral condi-
tions that must be met for permitting evil.
A. The Necessity Condition: the good secured by the permission of the evil, 
E, could not have been secured without permitting either E or some evils 
morally equivalent to or worse than E.
B. The Outweighing Condition: the good secured by the permission of the 
evil is sufficiently outweighing.
C. The Rights Condition: it is within the rights of the one permitting the evil 
to permit it.
What sort of CDs could do this? Murray proposes that the theist needs to 
construct hypotheses (i) that show that the evil in question meets condi-
tions A through C, and (ii) that the theist “is not justified or warranted in 
rejecting in the light of the claims she justifiably accepts” (39).
Ideally, the justifiable acceptances in the CDs would be held in common 
to theists and nontheists alike. Murray contends that many of the CDs 
contain explanations that “do not stand in tension with most of what I will 
take to be a common set of justified acceptances endorsed by individuals 
who are reasonably well-educated in matters of contemporary philosophy 
and science” (39). Still, there may vast differences between what theists 
and nontheists justifiably accept, so the objectives of CDs can differ. The 
point of some is to show that the theist can defend the rationality of her 
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belief in the face of evil; the point of others is to show that the non-theist 
is not justified in rejecting theism on the basis of evil. Still others, Murray 
claims, will do both. The CDs that purportedly can undermine the eviden-
tial argument from evil by showing that the non-theist is not justified in 
rejecting theism on the basis of animal suffering are of particular interest. 
If it turns out that all a CD can do is offer epistemic comfort for the theist; 
i.e., theism is defensible only because the theist can maintain rationality 
given what she but not the non-theist accepts, it’s hard to see how the CD 
could be called a success at all. Indeed it would be hard to distinguish a 
CD from a mere defense. But again, Murray contends some of the CDs 
have enough force to demonstrate that atheism cannot be defended on the 
grounds of appealing to gratuitous evil.
The scope of CDs discussed by Murray is impressive. He analyzes ar-
guments carefully, critically, and charitably. He carefully dissects CDs that 
associate animal suffering with the Fall, concluding that the variety of this 
CD that appeals to a pre-human fall of Satan and his cohorts might be 
defensible, since, at least for some of us, none of our warranted accep-
tances justify the rejection of this CD. Still, Murray acknowledges that few 
people, theist or not, are likely to find this CD attractive.
The most compelling of the CDs Murray analyzes are the “nomic- 
regularity” CDs. Murray favors the chaos to nomic-regularity CD (CTO). 
The supposition of this CD is that a universe that moves from chaos to 
order is intrinsically good, and that animal pain in such a universe is un-
avoidable and outweighed by the intrinsic goodness of the CTO universe. 
Murray states, “Animal suffering is necessary since, in a world that is 
governed by nomic regularity and CTO, a spectrum of organisms with 
increasingly complex cognitive capacities is necessary in order to secure 
the emergence of beings capable of morally significant freedom” (191). 
Thus, Murray argues that the CTO CD meets all three conditions (Neces-
sity, Outweighing, and Rights). But the critic’s position is that it does seem 
logically possible that an omnipotent being could have brought about an 
orderly world with significantly morally free beings, without the animal 
suffering. Of course, the critic could be wrong, but isn’t she justified in 
believing that the Necessity Condition is not met? So, the most that can be 
said for the CTO CD is that appropriately amended, the theist can main-
tain the rationality of her belief because, for all she knows, the animal 
suffering does meet the Necessity Condition. But the nontheist has little 
reason to think this.
The least compelling, but perhaps the most interesting, CD Murray de-
fends is an updated appeal to a neo-Cartesian view about animals. Murray 
describes and defends this approach in some detail, and offers four distinct 
versions of the view. In general the contention seems to be that we are not 
justified in rejecting the claim that animals lack phenomenal conscious-
ness. And without phenomenal consciousness, there can be no awareness 
of pain. Clearly, without awareness of pain, there just is no problem of 
animal suffering. Whatever the merits of this neo-Cartesian view, it is not 
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properly a CD at all. There is no reason given for the permission of animal 
suffering; instead, the Neo-Cartesian approach is simply to deny this is a 
genuine problem at all.
While it’s not a proper CD, since a proper CD would have to acknowl-
edge that animal suffering is an evil and then explain it, neo-Cartesianism 
must be taken seriously. After all, if it is successful, the problem just goes 
away. And recall that the standard for success is fairly low. Neo-Cartesian-
ism need only be shown to be as plausible as not, given what we know. 
The Cartesian picture can be supported by drawing a distinction between 
access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, a well-known dis-
tinction in contemporary philosophy of mind. Access consciousness simply 
means that the mental representations are available for an individual to use 
in rational action or speech. Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective 
feel, having to with qualitative experiences. A robot could access its various 
cognitive states, avoid noxious stimuli, etc., while having no phenomenally 
conscious states at all. There need be nothing that it is like to be that robot. 
When Thomas Nagel wrote his famous “What it’s Like to Be a Bat?,” he as-
sumed that there is something that it’s like to be a bat.1
That is to say, bats and other animals are sentient beings. So, Neo- 
Cartesians can maintain that while many animals may have access con-
sciousness, they do not necessarily have phenomenal consciousness. And 
it’s only phenomenal consciousness that counts from a moral point of view 
and with respect to the problem of God and animal pain.
What then would make a mental state phenomenally conscious? Mur-
ray describes one theory as follows:
For a mental state to be a conscious state (phenomenally) requires an ac-
companying higher-order mental state (a HOT) that has that state as its in-
tentional object. The HOT must be thought that one is, oneself, in that first-
order state. Only humans have the cognitive faculties required to form the 
conception of themselves being in a first-order state that one must have in 
order to have a HOT. (55)
Thus, one can attribute a rich mental life to animals, including having 
pain states, and recognize that these states can accessed in the cognitive 
economy of individuals, playing a causal role in their behaviors, while 
maintaining that animals do not have the higher order mental states that 
would make them aware of the other mental states. So, they could actu-
ally be in pain, but since they don’t have the mental capacity to represent 
themselves as being in pain, their pain is phenomenally nonconscious.
Murray shows how the neo-Cartesian positions can deflect various sorts 
of objections. Behavioral evidence in favor of animal pain and suffering is 
at best inconclusive because the behavioral evidence can be explained by 
1Nagel’s essay is widely published, e.g., in The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical De-
bates, ed. Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1997). The distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness was first put forward 
in Ned Block’s paper “On a Confusion About the Function of Consciousness,” which is also 
included in this helpful volume.
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appeals to access consciousness alone. Thus alleged similarities in behavior 
can be accounted for by appealing to certain human cases where conscious-
ness seems to play a role, but doesn’t, such as automatic driving, reaction to 
painful stimuli without awareness of pain, blind-sightedness, etc.
If the HOT theory is true, phenomenal consciousness would indeed 
seem unavailable to most animals. There are, however, alternative plau-
sible theories of consciousness that are friendlier to the thesis that animals 
are phenomenally consciousness than the HOT theory.2 And, if we accept 
the neo-Cartesian view of phenomenal consciousness, we must also accept 
that infants and severely mentally defective human beings do not feel pain, 
for they would not have the capacity to have the requisite higher order 
mental states to be phenomenally conscious. Perhaps, as Murray suggests, 
harming animals is morally objectionable on other grounds, but tortur-
ing animals, infants, or severely mentally defective human beings would 
clearly not be possible. If infants can feel pain HOT or similar theories are 
false. With respect to animals, pain behavior is stronger than Murray ac-
knowledges. Anatomical similarities between humans and other animals, 
the fact that many animals have endogenous pain control systems, and 
the observation that analgesics and anesthetics work on many animals in 
just the way they work on human beings all suggest that many animals 
actually feel their pains. Anatomical similarities and evolutionary evidence 
provide strong (though admittedly not conclusive) evidence that animals 
can and do suffer.
The skeptical argument of Neo-Cartesianism seems to run something 
like this; because it’s possible that certain creaturely actions can be account-
ed for without appealing to consciousness, it’s reasonable to conclude they 
didn’t. That type of reasoning doesn’t work generally, and it won’t work 
here. It may be possible that I don’t sweeten my coffee, but whether or 
not it’s reasonable to claim I don’t will depend on examining the actual 
evidence. The evidence we have suggests that many animals do have phe-
nomenally conscious states. Of course, in principle, much of this evidence 
can be explained with access consciousness alone. But given that no one has 
yet discovered a consciousness structure in the brain, we can also account 
for human behavior without phenomenal consciousness as well. That’s 
why it’s so easy to think of androids, robots, or zombies behaving just like 
us without any phenomenal states at all. Neo-Cartesian arguments that 
make animals into zombies can do the same for us. The problem of animal 
consciousness is a special case of the problem of other minds. It may seem 
possible to doubt the conscious states of other beings, but possibility does 
not entail “as plausible as not, given our justified acceptances.”
It is not clear that any of the CDs or any combination of them is supe-
rior to the Inscrutibilist position Murray discusses in the very first chapter. 
If one has good reason to think that God exists and would not permit 
2For a concise overview of arguments for and against animal consciousness, see Colin 
Allen and Mark Bekoff, “Animal Consciousness,” in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 
ed. Max Velmans and Susan Schneider (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 58–71.
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gratuitous evil, then it follows there one has good reason to think there 
is no gratuitous evil. It is just beyond the scope of human understanding 
to grasp what those reasons might be. The nontheist is not convinced of 
course, but also cannot easily show the theist’s view about God and ani-
mal pain is irrational. It is hard to see how the suffering of this or that par-
ticular fawn dying slowly in a forest fire is logically necessary to lead to a 
greater good, even in the light of the more plausible CDs Murray defends. 
It may not be reasonable to expect a CD or combination of CDs to do that. 
The real value of Murray’s book is that it attempts to take the problem of 
animal suffering seriously. The hope of the CD approach is to investigate 
what some of those reasons might be. The danger of the CD approach, at 
least for some of them, is they may unjustifiably minimize the significance 
of animal suffering or simply explain it away. Murray’s work is a well-
argued comprehensive examination of this topic making use of the best 
resources not only from philosophy of religion, but also philosophy of 
mind and ethics. It will provoke, I expect, lively discussion on this topic 
for some time. It does not, however, solve the problem of God and animal 
pain. That problem just won’t go away.
Thinking Through Feeling: God, Emotion and Passibility, by Anastasia Philippa 
Scrutton. New York: Continuum, 2011. 227 pages. $120.00 (hardcover).
RICHARD E. CREEL, Professor Emeritus, Ithaca College (NY)
Debates regarding the passibility or impassibility of God have to do, in 
large part, with whether God experiences, or even can experience, cer-
tain emotions. Thinking Through Feeling was written by Anastasia Philippa 
Scrutton out of her conviction that philosophy of the emotions has impor-
tant implications for answers to questions about the passibility or impas-
sibility of God. Scrutton prefers to speak of philosophy of the emotions, 
rather than of emotion in the singular, because “emotions are so diverse 
that few generalizations can be made about them” (144). Hence, she pre-
fers to take a Wittgensteinian, family resemblance approach to emotions 
rather than seeking for an essence of emotion.
Through her historical survey at the beginning of Thinking and her 
many presentations of contemporary scholars, Scrutton’s book proves to 
be a valuable resource and she proves to be an able thinker regarding 
her two central topics: the emotions and the nature of God vis a vis the 
emotions. Her careful, penetrating analyses reveal a serious, subtle, well-
studied mind.
For readers unfamiliar with the divine impassibility debate and the 
philosophy of emotions, chapter 1 is a valuable survey. For readers fa-
miliar with those topics, chapter 1 might be skipped except that Scrutton 
does a good job of showing that, unlike what many believe, there is not a 
sharp historical divide between those who believe in divine impassibiity 
